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THE SHERMAN ACT AND
BAR ADMISSION RESIDENCE REQUIREMENTS
In recent months the legal profession has found itself the object
of critical scrutiny by large and vocal segments of the American
public.1 Evidence of political and professional wrongdoing on the
part of persons trained in the law has incited a wave of disapproval of
lawyers and the legal profession.2 While the subject of this article-
the potential liability of the organized bar under the Sherman Act for
restrictive residence requirements-is not calculated to engender the
same degree of consternation on the part of the public, its ramifications
are no less significant for the public and the profession.3 The absence
of dramatic public impact hardly reflects the dimensions of the
problem.'
The similarity between professional admission requirements and
the process of acceptance as a member of a medieval guild has been
widely noted. 5 The avowed purpose of such requirements is protection
of the public from incompetence and wrongdoing.6 As in the medieval
guilds, however, an implicit, and possibly compelling, motive for sup-
port of restrictive admission standards is the desire to exclude potential
competitors as a means of ensuring the economic well-being of present
I See generally Manning, If Lawyers Were Angels: A Sermon in One Canon, 60 A.B.A.J.
821 (1974); Thomforde, Public Opinion of the Legal Profession: A Necessary Response By
the Bar and the Law School, 41 TENN. L. REV. 503 (1974); Waltz, Some Thoughts on the
Legal Profession's Public Image, 23 DEPAUL L. REV. 651 (1974).
SIt would be unfair to say that the profession is not sensitive to such criticism, though
concrete proposals for corrective action are limited. See Meserve, Watergate: Lessons and
Challenges for the Legal Profession, 59 A.B.A.J. 681 (1973).
3 Ultimately, a large measure of responsibility for correcting abuses within the profession
must lie with attorneys themselves. For an extended discussion of the efficacy of such
self-regulation in the context of attorney discipline see Marks & Cathcart, Discipline Within
the Legal Profession: Is it Self-Regulation? 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 193 (1974).
1 The potential significance of an antitrust analysis of bar admission procedures was
recognized by the majority in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 497 F.2d 1, (4th Cir. 1974), cert.
granted, 95 S. Ct. 223 (1974), in dictum to which this article in part, owes its genesis:
To hold that the practice of law is subject to the Sherman Act would cast doubt
upon the validity of bar admission standards, prohibitions upon advertising,
and a multitude of other restrictions upon the practice of law.
Id. at 19.
5 M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 141 (1962); W. GELLHORN, INDIVIDUAL FREE-
DOM AND GOVERNMENTAL RESTRAINTS 113 (1965); Bard & Bamford, The Bar: Professional
Association or Medieval Guild? 19 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 393, 425 (1970).
6 M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 148; W. GELLHORN, supra note 5, at 109; Holen, Effects of
Professional Licensing Arrangements on Interstate Labor Mobility and Resource Alloca-
tion, 73 J. POL. ECON. 492 (1965); Horack, "Trade Barriers" to Bar Admission, 28 J. AM.
JUD. Soc'y 102 (1944); Moore, The Purpose of Licensing, 4 J. LAW & ECON. 93, 95 (1961).
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members of the occupational group.7 The consequent reduction of
competition which results from erecting barriers to entry represents a
matter of economic significance to society at large, since an under-
supply of attorneys is likely to produce not only higher incomes for
established practitioners but also increased costs for legal services in
general.8
The Sherman Act ' demonstrates the manner in which residence
requirements restrain trade. Although residence requirements have
been invalidated on constitutional grounds by some courts, employing
an equal protection or right-to-travel rationale,"° the flexibility of an
alternative statutory basis for invalidation might prove persuasive to a
court hesitant to reach the constitutional issues involved. Furthermore,
particular residence requirements which a court might not deem un-
constitutional could still constitute Sherman Act violations.
But the arguably anticompetitive practices of the legal profession
have been exempted from close judicial scrutiny under the "learned
profession" exemption. 1 Likewise, where these practices are associ-
ated with an asserted state policy limiting competition, the "state
action" exemption to the antitrust laws, as enunciated in Parker v.
Brown," has been invoked." Without minimizing the significance of
these traditional obstacles to antitrust analysis, it will be argued that
a judicial unwillingness to subject residence requirements to intensive
antitrust examination is unsupported by logic or policy and works a
disservice to attorneys and the general public.
This article will focus on the restrictive aspects of residence qualifi-
cations for admission to the state bar. Such restrictions are significant
in three cases: initial admission to the bar, relocation by a foreign
attorney, and multistate practice by an attorney admitted to the bar in
another state. An attempt will be made to determine whether these
7 M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 148; W. GELLHORN, supra note 5, at 109; Dalton &
Williamson, State Barriers Against Migrant Lawyers, 25 U. KANSAS CITY L. REV. 144,
147-48 (1958); Holen, supra note 6, at 494; Horack, supra note 6, at 106; Moore, supra note 6,
at 95.
8 See notes 168-71 and accompanying text infra. Thie problem would appear to be aggra-
vated where minimum fee schedules are employed. See generally note 68 infra.
15 U.S.C. § I et seq. (1970).
10 See note 30 and accompanying text infra.
" For the most recent expression of the learned profession exemption from the federal
antitrust laws and a summary of the case law upon which it is based, see Goldfarb v. Virginia
State Bar, 497 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 223 (1974); cf. United States v.
Oregon State Bar, 385 F. Supp. 507 (D. Ore. 1974). See also Note, Antitrust Law: An
Application of the Sherman Act to the Professions, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 740 (1973); Note, The
Applicability of the Sherman Act to Legal Practice and Other "Non-Commercial" Ac-
tivities, 82 YALE LJ. 313 (1972).
12 317 U.S. 341 (1943). State action exemption is discussed in part III C infra.
13 See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 497 F.2d 1,4-12 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. granted,
95 S. Ct. 223 (1974).
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requirements might be invalid under the Sherman Act and to analyze
the case for their abolition. The commercial counterpart of professional
entry restrictions has been termed "the very essence of monopoly,'
14
and on this basis it is submitted that further freedom from antitrust
scrutiny is unjustifiable.
I. RESIDENCE REQUIREMENTS: RATIONALE
AND EFFECT
Traditionally, bar admission requirements have been established by
the states and justified by an acknowledged state interest in regulating
the practice of law. 15 In general, standards for admission are estab-
lished and applied by the state supreme court, which in turn delegates
administrative responsibility for examination of applicants to a com-
mittee of law or bar examiners.1 6 Some states which regulate the prac-
tice of law by means of an integrated state bar 7 vest that body or its
14 Harris, Restrictive Practices in the Professions, 120 NEw L.J. 1048 (1970). In United
States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948), Mr. Justice Douglas, for the court, addressed himself
to the restraint brought about by exclusion from competition:
Hence the existence of power "to exclude competition when it is desired to do
so" is itself a violation of § 2 [of the Sherman Act] provided it is coupled with
the purpose or intent to exercise that power .... It is indeed "unreasonable
per se to foreclose competitors from any substantial market." . . . The anti-
trust laws are as much violated by the prevention of competition as by its
destruction.
Id. at 107 (citations omitted).
15 See generally Sprecher, Admission to Practice Law, 40 STATE GOV'T 21 (1967); cf. note
116 and accompanying text infra.
Reluctance of federal courts to interfere with state regulation of the practice of law was
expressed in Brown v. Supreme Court of Virginia, 359 F. Supp. 549 (E.D. Va. 1973), aff'd
sub nom., Titus v. Supreme Court of Virginia, 414 U.S. 1034 (1973). A Virginia Supreme
Court rule, requiring reciprocally admitted attorneys to maintain Virginia residency and to
practice full time in Virginia but not imposing the same restrictions on attorneys admitted by
examination, was challenged on equal protection and right to travel grounds. The district
court rejected the challenge and noted:
These cases involve ... the right of a state to establish and administer stan-
dards for admission to the bar-a field into which federal courts should be
especially reluctant and slow to enter, but one in which there is a duty to
investigate in appropriate cases.
359 F. Supp. at 551 (citations omitted).
16 THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE UNITED STATES 27 (2d ed. American Bar Foundation
1970). See generally RULES FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR (West 1972).
17 Integration of the bar has been defined as:
The act of organizing the bar of a state into an association, membership in
which is condition precedent to the practice of law. Integration is accomplished
by enactment of detailed statutes, by enactment of a short statute conferring
authority upon the highest court of the state to integrate the bar, or by rule of
court in the exercise of its inherent power.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 946-47 (4th ed. 1968). In slightly over fifty years, the integrated bar
movement has experienced significant growth. See generally D. MCKEAN, THE INTEGRATED
BAR (1963); Winters, The Unified Bar, 23 ARK. L. REV. 526 (1969). See also Lathrop v.
Donohue, 367 U.S. 820(1961), which upheld the constitutionality of a state's conditioning the
right to practice law upon membership in an integrated bar association.
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representatives with responsibility for setting and administering ad-
mission requirements.' 8  Finally, admission requirements may be
prescribed directly by statute, although the judicial branch may play
an administrative role in these states as well.' 9
Many authorities have singled out the suppression of competition as
a commonplace, albeit unfortunate, by-product -of the licensing
process.20 More specifically, at least one study has noted a positive
correlation between restrictive entry requirements and average attor-
neys' income within a given state.2 The anti-competitive motive of
residence requirements would appear to be magnified in states where
established practitioners participate in the formulation and adminis-
tration of admission requirements. Legitimate criticism has been
directed at the intimate involvement of members of the licensed pro-
fession in such activity.22 The exlusive presence of members of the
profession on the licensing board, it must be conceded, is not unique
to the legal profession. It has been estimated that 75 percent of the
licensing bodies at work today exhibit this characteristic.23 The
potential dangers inherent in self-regulation might be greatly reduced
if judicial review were easily obtainable. However, active supervision of
licensing boards in the legal profession by state courts has been seen
by some as more myth than reality.24
Having noted the economic motives which are inherent in licensing
IS See D. MCKEAN, supra note 17, at 124. While the integrated bar has assumed an
important role in attorney discipline, the level of its influence over the admission process, at
least through formal channels, has been less pervasive. See V. COUNTRYMAN & T. FINMAN,
THE LAWYER IN MODERN SOCIETY 352 (1966).
'9 See generally Bard & Bamford, supra note 5, at 446-48.
20 M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 148; W. GELLHORN, supra note 5, at 114, 126-27; Bard &
Bamford, supra note 5, at 441; Donnem, Federal Antitrust Law Versus Anti-competitive
State Regulation, 39 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 950,953 (1970); Eley, Michigan's Professional
and Occupational Licensing Boards: Organization and Powers, 41 U. DET. L.J. 347, 349
(1964); Horack, supra note 6, at 102; Nahstoll, Freedom to Practice Law in Another State, 55
A.B.A.J. 57, 58 (1969); Note, Attorneys: Interstate and Federal Practice, 80 HARV. L. REV.
1711 (1967).
One case, while declaring unconstitutional Mississippi's one-year residence requirement
for admission to the bar, raised the issue of an economic motivation for entry restrictions but
refused to speculate on any possible exclusionary motive on the part of the local bar. Lipman
v. Van Zant, 329 F. Supp. 391, 401 (N.D. Miss. 1971).
21 Holen, supra note 6, at 494-95.
22 M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 140; W. GELLHORN, supra note 5, at 115; Moore, supra
note 6, at 95, 99.
23 W. GELLHORN, supra note 5, at 140. The enormous pressure which organized private
occupational groups are able to bring to bear on their brethem in such positions is noted in
Barron, Business and Professional Licensing-California, a Representative Example, 18
STAN. L. REV. 640, 650 (1966).
24 See Comment, Controlling Lawyers by Bar Associations and Courts, 5 HARV. CIV.
RIGHTS-CIv. LIB. L. REV. 301, 315 (1970). See also Annot., 39 A.L.R.3d 719, 721 (1971),
which suggests the reluctance of the courts to actively supervise the functioning of bar
examination boards, at least with respect to individual admission cases.
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schemes and detract from impartiality, it is necessary to examine in
more detail the effect which restrictive residence requirements have
on the practice of law.25 Residence restrictions, with regard to both
initial entry and interstate movement and practice of attorneys, are
consistent with a rationale of protection of the economic interests
of the local bar.
To both the novice attorney seeking admission to the bar and
the experienced practitioner contemplating a permanent relocation
or a substantial interstate practice, state residence requirements are
a particularly onerous prerequisite to practice which may, in some
cases, work a substantial economic hardship.26 At this writing twenty-
five jurisdictions require some residence qualification for initial
admission to the bar 2 while twenty-one states mandate residence
2- The remainder of this article will focus exclusively upon the restrictive character of
residence requirements, leaving aside the other primary qualifications for membership in the
bar-successful performance on a state bar examination and character and fitness require-
ments. While serious criticism has been directed at these qualifications, residence require-
ments appear to be most arbitrary in their restrictive effects. For a critical treatment of
character and fitness requirements see generally Comment, Controlling Lawyers by Bar
Associations and Courts, 5 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS--Civ. LiB. L. REV. 301 (1970). See also
Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 301 (1959).
26 While the most restrictive residence requirements, ranging from six months to one year,
have generally been abandoned, many of those still in effect require residence at the time of
application for admission, which may predate examination by as much as one to three
months. Admittedly, a pre-admission residence requirement standing alone would not con-
stitute the same type of burden in light of the delay incident to bar examination scoring in
most states. It has been pointed out, however, that
[e]conomic considerations such as support of a family or repayment of accumu-
lated educational debts may make it imperative that a recent graduate or lawyer
be eligible to begin his practice as soon as possible.
Note, Residence Requirements for Initial Admission to the Bar: A Compromise Proposalfor
Change, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 831, 841 (1971). For this and similar reasons, see W. GELL-
HORN, supra note 5, at 127 (terms such requirements "disqualifications" rather than "qual-
ifications").
27 States which require a residence qualification other than residence at time of admission
or intent to reside for initial admission to the bar are: Alaska (bona fide residence for thirty
days prior to first day of examination with residence continuing through certification for
admission); Colorado (bona fide residence, thirty days prior to examination, continuing
through examination and admission); Delaware (actual residence at time of examination and
six months' residence prior to admission); Georgia (twelve months' residence for graduates
of non-ABA-accredited law schools; all others, residence at time of examination and intent to
continue in residence for one year); Hawaii (actual and bona fide residence for three months
prior to admission; physically present seventy five percent of time); Iowa (residence at time
of application, which must be filed at least thirty days prior to examination); Kansas
(residence at time of application, which must be filed at least ninety days prior to examina-
tion); Maryland (actual residence in order to petition for bar examination and for admission to
bar); Mississippi (residence at time of application which must be filed three months prior to
examination); Montana (six months' continuous actual and bona fide residence prior to
application, which must be filed at least forty-five days prior to examination); Nebraska
(bona fide residence at time of application, which must be filed at least one month prior to
examination); Nevada (bona fide residence prior to March 1 of year of examination and
continued residence through examination, which is at end of July); New Mexico (bona fide
residence and domicile in state ninety days prior to admission and physical presence for
seventy-five days); North Carolina (bona fide citizenship and residence on and after June 15
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requirements for attorneys who seek admission from another state. ',
The asserted justifications for residence requirements are numerous.
Among the most common are assurance that the applicant possesses
a sufficient knowledge of local government and legal custom, oppor-
tunity for local bar officials to observe the applicant's character and
fitness to practice law, indication of a bona fide intent on the part of
the applicant to continue a practice in the state, and protection of the
public from unscrupulous practitioners with no local affiliations.29 In
a series of recent cases, however, several courts have pierced these
rationalizations and have invalidated residence requirements on con-
stitutional grounds. 30 In each case, the residence requirements were
of year in which applicant takes examination, which is at the end of July); Oklahoma (actual
residence at time of examination, residence for at least 60 days prior to admission); Rhode
Island (three months' residence prior to admission); South Carolina (actual residence for not
less than three months prior to filing application for examination, which must be filed at least
four months prior to examination); Tennessee (domicile and physical residence for two
months before receiving license); Texas (residence for not less than three months prior to bar
examination); Utah (residence for three months prior to date of taking bar examination);
Vermont (establishment of physical residence in state six months prior to admission);
Virginia (residence from December 15 prior to February examination and May 15 prior to
July examination and must remain in residence to time of taking examination); West Virginia
(residence for thirty days prior to admission to take bar examination); Wisconsin (residence
at time of application, which must be filed at least sixty days prior to examination); Wyoming
(bona fide residence at time of application, which must be at least thirty days prior to
examination; bona fide, actual residence for six months prior to admission. 1975 BAR EXAM
DIGEST (Center for Creative Educational Services, Inc. 1975).
28 States imposing a residence requirement on foreign attorneys for admission with or
without examination are: Alaska (same as initial admission); Connecticut (actual residence
for six months prior to application and intent to conduct major part of practice in state);
Delaware (bona fide residence and intent to maintain principal office in state); Hawaii (same
as initial admission); Illinois (actual residence at time of application and intent to maintain
office in state for continuous and active practice of law); Indiana (bona fide residence and
intent to engage in practice; requirements may be waived if requirements of otherjurisdiction
are less severe); Kansas (same as initial admission); Maryland (domiciliary of state with
intent to practice law and have office therein); Mississippi (residence for not less than six
months immediately prior to admission); Montana (same as initial admission); Nebraska
(same as initial admission); Nevada (same as initial admission); New Mexico (same as initial
admission); North Carolina (bonafide residence for at least sixty days immediately preceding
consideration of application); Oklahoma (depends upon rules in foreign jurisdiction from
which attorney seeks admission); Rhode Island (same as for initial admission); South
Carolina (same as for initial admission); Texas (same as for initial admission); Utah (actual,
continuous, and bona fide residence for period of at least three months prior to date of filing
application); Washington (residence 180 days prior to examination); West Virginia (thirty
days' residence and intent to practice). 1975 BAR EXAM DIGEST (Center for Creative Educa-
tional Services, 1975).
29 Lipman v. Van Zant, 329 F. Supp. 391, 400 (N.D. Miss. 1971); Keenan v. Board of Law
Examiners of State of North Carolina, 317 F. Supp. 1350, 1359 (E.D.N.C. 1970); Bard &
Bamford, supra note 5, at 403-04; Brakel, A Look at Multistate Practice Restrictions, 60
A.B.A.J. 1084, 1086 (1974).
30 Lipman v. Van Zant, 329 F. Supp. 391 (N.D. Miss. 1971) (declared Mississippi's
one-year pre-application residence requirement unconstitutional as violation of equal protec-
tion); Potts v. Honorable Justices of Supreme Court of Hawaii, 332 F. Supp. 1392 (D. Hawaii
1971) (declared Hawaii's requirement of six months' physical residence in state after age
fifteen unconstitutional as violation of equal protection); Webster v. Wofford, 321 F. Supp.
1259 (N.D. Ga. 1970) (declared Georgia's one-year pre-admission residence requirement
unconstitutional as violation of equal protection); Keenan v. Board of Law Examiners of
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struck down because the avowed goals could be achieved by less
restrictive methods and because little direct correlation was seen be-
tween the residence requirements and the functions they allegedly
served."'
A comparison between restrictive residence requirements and the
relative ease with which attorneys may be admitted to practice pro
hac vice further undermines the alleged justifications for residence
requirements. In many states the admission of a foreign attorney on a
limited basis is often little more than a formality. At most, association
with local counsel is required. 2 If states truly are possessed of an
overriding concern to protect their citizens from being victimized by
unethical or incompetent attorneys, it is difficult to perceive how such
an end is achieved by allowing foreign attorneys to practice in a state,
even on a limited basis, without effective local control. Indeed, a more
effective array of sanctions may exist for disciplining the attorney who
has been admitted on a regular basis to the state bar than is the case
with attorneys admitted pro hac vice. 3
It has been suggested that residence requirements impose a burden
on the interstate mobility of attorneys.3 4 At least one court has held
that a one-year residence requirement represents an unconstitutional
infringement of the right to travel.35 Misallocation of attorney resources
among states has been viewed as a consequence of residence restric-
tions.36 At the same time, as business and commercial activities take
on an increasingly national character, residence requirements which
inhibit the attorney from engaging in multistate practice should be
viewed more critically. 7 It is not unreasonable for a client to expect
State of North Carolina, 317 F. Supp. 1350 (E.D.N.C. 1970) (declared North Carolina's
one-year pre-examination residence requirement unconstitutional as violation of equal pro-
tection). Contra, Suffling v. Bondurant, 339 F. Supp. 257 (D..N.M. 1972), aff 'd sub nor.,
Rose v. Bondurant, 409 U.S. 1020 (1972) (sustained New Mexico's six-month pre-admission
residence requirement).
"' See note 30 supra.
32 Brakel, supra note 29, at 1084-86; Katz, Admission of Nonresident Attorneys Pro Hac
Vice, Research Contributions of the Am. B. Foundation (No. 5 1968), in A. CONARD, R.
KNAUSS & S. SIEGEL, ENTERPRISE ORGANIZATION: CASES, STATUTES & ANALYSIS 30(1972).
33 Cf. Marks & Cathcart, supra note 3 at 208-09.
By implication, perhaps pro hac vice requirements should be made more stringent, but this
approach should yield the same undesirable consequences characteristic of residence qual-
ifications for admission.
3' Holen, supra note 6, at 493-96, 498.
31 Keenan v. Board of Law Examiners of State of North Carolina, 317 F. Supp. 1350
(E.D.N.C. 1970); cf. Potts v. Honorable Justices of Supreme Court of Hawaii, 332 F. Supp.
1392 (D. Hawaii 1971), which declined to reach the right to travel issue.
36 See note 34 supra.
37 See Bard & Bamford, supra note 5, at 393; Morris, State Borders: Unnecessary Barriers
to Effective Law Practice, 53 A. B.A.J. 530, 531 (1967); Nahstoll, supra note 20, at 57; Note,
Attorneys: Interstate and Federal Practice, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1711 (1967); Comment, The
Wisconsin Minimum Fee Schedule: A Problem of Antitrust, 1968 WiS. L. REV. 1237, 1246-47
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his attorney to render comprehensive service, but residence qualifica-
tions which restrict practice in another state may undermine that
assumption. Finally, the significant impact of restricting entry upon
the cost and availability of legal services to the public should be
emphasized.
3 8
In short, residence requirements for bar admission, rather than
advancing legitimate state interests, have a number of deleterious
effects: denial of admission to otherwise competent attorneys, pro-
tectionist effects with respect to members of the state bar, and restric-
tions on the ability of attorneys to engage in substantial interstate
practice. The question, then, is whether the Sherman Antitrust Act is
the appropriate mechanism for addressing the problem.
II. THE SHERMAN ACT AND THE PROFESSIONS
Current discussion in the field of antitrust law has taken a renewed
interest in subjecting the practices of professional groups to examina-
tion under the Sherman Act. 9 The Justice Department's successful
attack on bar-sanctioned minimum fee schedules in United States v.
Oregon State Bar40 may signal the start of a concerted effort by the
Antitrust Division to prosecute Sherman Act violations among the
professions. 4 The Antitrust Division may have become particularly
sensitive to the antitrust implications of activities within the legal
profession.42
(1968). While it might be argued that interstate practice could be facilitated by more extensive
use of thepro hac vice device, that approach fails to address itself to the substantial ongoing
needs that would be served by relatively simple procurement of multiple state bar member-
ship.
38 See notes 168-171 and accompanying text infra.
39 Two recent cases, Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 497 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1974), cert.
granted, 95 S. Ct. 223 (1974), and U.S. v. Oregon State Bar, 385 F. Supp. 507 (D. Ore. 1974),
have considered the applicability of the Sherman Act to bar-sanctioned minimum fee
schedules. A recent sampling of law review commentary includes: Note, Antitrust Law: An
Application of the Sherman Act to the Professions, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 740 (1973); Note, The
Applicability of the Sherman Act to Legal Practice and Other "Non-Commercial" Ac-
tivities, 82 YALE L.J. 313 (1972); Comment, The Wisconsin Minimum Fee Schedule: A
Problem of Antitrust, 1968 Wis. L. REV. 1237 (1968).
4 The District Court denied the Oregon State Bar's motion for summary judgment on
learned profession and state action defenses. 385 F. Supp. 507 (D. Ore. 1974).
41 The Supreme Court's grant of certiorari in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 95 S. Ct. 223
(1974), subjects the continued vitality of the Oregon State Bar decision to some doubt. The
Court has indicated that it will address itself directly to the validity of minimum fee
schedules. See generally 5 TRADE REG. REP. 60,021, at 65,107 (Jan. 20, 1975).
42 See Address of Bruce Wilson, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Department of
Justice Antitrust Division, to Pennsylvania Bar Ass'n Conference of County Bar Officers, 5
TRADE REG. REP. 50,131, at 55,215 (1972). See also Donnem, supra note 20; Note, The
Antitrust Division v. the Professions-"No Bidding" Clauses and Fee Schedules, 48 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 966, 967 (1973).
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A successful antitrust challenge to state residence requirements
would face, at the outset, three judicially recognized barriers to the
imposition of an antitrust sanction upon the profession: the issue of
whether or not the practice of law constitutes "trade or commerce"
within the meaning of the Sherman Antitrust Act,43 the "learned pro-
fession" exemption,44 and the "state action" exemption.45 Each of the
possible restrictions will be analyzed in turn, but it must be remem-
bered that the exemptions, which operate in derogation of the policies
of the antitrust laws, should be strictly construed and applied only
where the conditions for exemption are clearly satisfied.
III. BARRIERS TO APPLICATION OF THE
SHERMAN ACT
A. Trade or Commerce Under the Sherman Act
Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act4 7 declares illegal "every
contract, combination ... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or com-
merce among the several States .... " Section 2 of the Act4s renders
unlawful the activity of
every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monop-
olize any part of the trade or commerce among the several
States ....
In order to subject any activity to the sanctions of the Sherman Act,
therefore, it must be shown that "commerce among the several states"
has been affected. In delineating the meaning of that phrase, the
Supreme Court has interpreted the reach of the Sherman Act to be
coextensive with the power of Congress under the commerce clause.
49
13 15 U.S.C. § I et seq. (1970).
14 See part III B infra.
15 The exemption was established in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). See part III C
infra.
46 Pogue, The Rationale of Exemptions From Antitrust, 19 PROCEEDINGS OF ABA SECTION
OF ANTITRUST LAw 313, 327 (1961). In an exhaustive survey of antitrust exemptions Pogue
points out that the learned profession and state action exemptions are judicial and not
legislative creations, an observation which may lead one to inquire more closely into the
question of whether they are in harmony with the legislative policy of the Sherman Act, at
least insofar as the exemptions are not express products of legislative actions. See also
Norman's on the Waterfront, Inc. v. Wheatley, 317 F. Supp. 247, 253 (D.V.I. 1970), aff'd,
444 F.2d 1011 (3d Cir. 1971).
47 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
48 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
19 See United States v. Frankfort Distillers, Inc., 324 U.S. 293, 298 (1945); Apex Hosiery
Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 495 (1940); Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286
U.S. 427,435 (1932). U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8 reads in pertinent part, "The Congress shall have
Power to . . . regulate Commerce . . . among the several states ... "
SPRING 1975]
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Thus, the Act has been held to govern wholly intrastate activities hav-
ing a substantial effect on interstate commerce, as well as those more
traditionally thought to be "commerce among the several states." 0
Judicial construction of congressional power under the commerce
clause has resulted in significant expansion of that power.51
The search must be for activities of the legal profession sufficiently
connected with interstate commerce to satisfy the jurisdictional re-
quirement.52 This nexus is not self-evident. Past challenges to allegedly
restrictive practices within the medical profession indicate that certain
activities will be held to be so inherently localized in effect that they
are beyond the reach of the Sherman Act. 53 Furthermore, a recent
decision of the National Labor Relations Board based its denial of
jurisdiction over the unionization activities of law firm employees
partly on the allegedly insubstantial impact which the practice of law
had on interstate commerce.
54
While the practice of law may be largely a "local" activity, several
possible interstate impacts should be noted. First, the demand for
goods and services moving in commerce is responsive in some degree
to the number of persons engaged in the practice of law, to the extent
that a smaller number of attorneys would dimish such demand. Such
a rationale has been accepted as satisfying the commerce jurisdictional
50 See Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Sugar Crystal Co., 334 U.S. 219, 234
(1948); Greenville Publishing Co., Inc. v. Daily Reflector, Inc., 496 F.2d 391, 395 (4th Cir.
1974); Rasmussen v. American Dairy Ass'n, 472 F.2d 517,522 (9th Cir. 1972). See also Note,
The Applicability of the Sherman Act to Legal Practice and Other "Non-Commercial"
Activities, 82 YALE L.J. 313, 321-24 (1972).
"' See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel Inc., v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). See also Note,
Bar Association Fee Schedules and Suggested Alternatives: Reflections on a Sherman
Exemption that Doesn't Exist, 3 U.C.L.A.-ALASKA L. REV. 207, 222 (1974).
52 See generally Searls, Trade or Commerce Among the Several States or With Foreign
Nations, in AN ANTITRUST HANDBOOK 141 (ABA Antitrust Section 1958), for a survey of the
types of activities which satisfy the Sherman Act's commerce requirement.
53 See Riggall v. Washington County Medical Society, 249 F.2d 266 (8th Cir. 1957), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 954 (1958); Spears Free Clinic & Hospital v. Cleere, 197 F.2d 125 (10th Cir.
1952). Riggall held that the complaint alleged no impact on interstate commerce sufficient to
sustain jurisdiction under the Sherman Act as a result of defendant's refusal to admit plaintiff
to membership in a county medical society, while Spears reached the same conclusion with
respect to defendant's alleged restraint on the practice of chiropractic in Colorado.
Although it is tempting to apply this reasoning to the legal profession on the grounds that
both law and medicine have traditionally been classified as "learned" professions, and both
involve personal dealing between practitioner and client or patient, it could be argued that the
practice of medicine tends to be more localized, while the legal profession has at least some
supra-state aspect in the nature of practice in the federal district courts.
"' Bodle, Fogel, Julber, Reinhardt & Rothschild and Local 495, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters,
206 N.L.R.B. No. 60, 84 L.R.R.M. 1321 (1973), 1973 CCH NLRB DEC. 25,863, at 33,339
(1973). The Board, noted that "the law firm does not itself engage in the production,
distribution or sale of goods in commerce," as a basis for declining to assert jurisdiction,
though the ruling may have hinged primarily upon interpretation of the National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 164(c)(1) (1970). In contrast, a strong dissenting opinion
stressed the effect of the legal profession on American business.
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requirement in both Sherman Act55 and non-Sherman Act56 cases. It
has also been proposed that the use of the mails in "giving advice,
billing clients, referring clients and subscribing to legal periodicals"
represents an activity sufficiently in interstate commerce to bring the
practice of law within the Sherman Act.57 In contrast, however, the
plaintiffs iri Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar5" unsuccessfully urged that
the requirement by out-of-state lenders that title to property be
examined by a Virginia attorney as a pre-condition to issuance of a
home loan mortgage brought the activities of the Virginia State Bar
and the Fairfax County Bar Association under the interstate commerce
ambit.
A second connection which could satisfy the interstate commerce
requirement of the Sherman Act lies in the impact that the practice of
law has upon~,activities which are themselves engaged in such com-
merce.59 It is apparent that the cost and availability of legal services,
both of which are closely related to the supply of attorneys, have a
direct influence upon the transaction of interstate business. The fact
that residence requirements limit access to the profession and thereby
tend to restrain competition shows that such requirements do affect
the cost and availability of legal services. The practice of law, there-
fore, should not be viewed as an exclusively local activity.6"
55 Doctors, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia, 490 F.2d 48 (3d Cir. 1973). But see
Riggall v. Washington County Medical Society, 249 F.2d 266(8th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 954 (1958); Spears Free Clinic & Hospital v. Cleere, 197 F.2d 125 (10th Cir. 1952).
56 Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294(1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
In Katzenbach the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the public accommodations
provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a et seq., as a valid exercise of
congressional power under the commerce clause, citing the impact on the movement of
goods in commerce which resulted from defendant's refusal to serve blacks. 379 U.S. at
299-301, 303-05. In Wickard the Court sustained regulation of wheat grown and consumed on
a single farm under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, 7 U.S.C. § 1340, on the ground
that such production and consumption affected the flow of wheat in interstate commerce. 317
U.S. at 127-29.
5' Comment, The Wisconsin Minimum Fee Schedule: A Problem of Antitrust, 1968 Wis.
L. REV. 1237, 1246-47.
58 497 F.2d 1, 15-19 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 223 (1974). The court held that
the impact on interstate commerce of such activity was merely "incidental." 497 F.2d at 18.
The question, on certiorari to the Supreme Court in Goldfarb, has been posed as follows:
Does a restraint of trade by attorneys in the fixing of fees for title examina-
tions in connection with obtaining mortgages on real estate in Northern Vir-
ginia, substantially restrain commerce among the several states, where the
undisputed evidence shows that a substantial portion of these mortgages in-
volve (a) loans made from persons outside of Virginia, and/or (b) guarantees by
agencies of the Federal Government headquartered in Washington, D.C.,
and/or (c) the purchase of a home by a nonresident of Virginia?
5 TRADE REG. REP. 60,021, at 65,107 (Jan. 20, 1975).
'9 See Brakel, supra note 29; Morris, supra note 37; Nahstoll, supra note 20. But see note
54 and accompanying text supra.
60 In United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944), the Sup-
reme Court ruled that interstate transactions in intangibles (specifically, insurance transac-
tions) were subject to the Sherman Act. Concededly, the impact which legal practice has
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A final source of Sherman Act jurisdiction over commerce rests
upon the influence which residence requirements have on interstate
mobility of attorneys and the consequent allocation of legal skills."'
While, in dictum, Mr. Justice Holmes, in Federal Baseball Club v.
National League of Professional Baseball Clubs2 commented that
"personal effort, not related to production, is not a subject of com-
merce, '"63 subsequent cases have clearly concluded that personal
services6" and service industries6 5 fall within the scope of the Sherman
Act. But the issue is not simply the movement of attorneys across state
lines; rather, it is the relationship of such movement to the efficient
allocation of attorneys as well as the restraint which may be imposed
upon interstate commercial transactions.66
Any of the three possible interstate impacts-the use of goods and
services moving in interstate commerce by those engaged in the prac-
tice of law, the pervasive influence of legal practice on activities
traditionally thought to be part of interstate commerce, and the effect
of licensing restrictions on interstate mobility of attorneys-suggests
sufficient nexus with interstate commerce to support application of the
Sherman Act to bar admission requirements.
B. The Learned Profession Exemption
The issues of interstate commerce jurisdiction and a learned profes-
sion exemption from antitrust law to some degree rest upon a similar
upon such commerce is once removed, but it has been suggested that the quantum of
"effect" on interstate commerce necessary to sustain a Sherman Act action has gradually
diminished. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940), a price fixing
case under § I of the Sherman Act, where the Court noted, for example, that
the amount of interstate or foreign trade involved is not material. . . since § I
of the Act brands as illegal the character of the restraint, not the amount of
commerce affected.
Id. at 225 n.59. See Wallace, Occupational Licensing and Certification: Remedies For
Denial, 14 WM. & MARY L. REV. 46, 93 (1972).
61 See W. GELLHORN, supra note 5, at 202 n.59, citing NATIONAL MANPOWER COUNCIL, A
POLICY FOR SKILLED MANPOWER (1959). Holen, supra note 6, at 498 concludes that
empirical evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that professional licensing
arrangements and practices in ... law restrict interstate mobility among...
lawyers and distort the allocation of professional personnel in [this] field.
62 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
63 259 U.S. at 209.
64 United States v. Nat'l Ass'n of Real Estate Boards, 339 U.S. 485 (1950). The Court held
that adoption by an association of real estate brokers in Washington, D.C., of standard rates
of commissions was a "restraint of trade" within the meaning of§ 3 of the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. § 3 (1970). The Court took pains to note, however, that it did not "intimate an opinion
on the correctness of the application of the term ["trade"] to the professions." Id. at 492.
65 See Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles 0. Finley & Co., 365 F. Supp. 235, 240
(N.D. Cal. 1972) (a sport concession service held subject to the Sherman Act); Pacific
Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific Far East Lines, Inc., 404 F.2d 804, 814 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1093 (1969) (found a Sherman Act violation in defendant's restraint upon
plaintiff's activity in providing transportation services).
66 The caveat is in order in light of another well-known Holmes dictum in Federal Baseball
to the effect that "a firm of lawyers sending out a member to argue a case. . does not engage
in such commerce because the lawyer ... goes to another state." 259 U.S. at 209.
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foundation, insofar as they relate to the commerce aspect of the
Sherman Act. The overlap, in theory, rests on the assertion that pro-
fessional activities do not affect "trade or commerce" or, alternatively,
are "traditionally noncommercial" in nature, and are therefore en-
titled to exemption.6 T For analytical purposes, however, they will be
treated as distinct issues under the Sherman Act.
The most recent significant affirmation of the learned profession
exemption has come in the case of Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar.68
The majority opinion in Goldfarb lent unqualified support to the
exemption in holding that the Virginia State Bar and Fairfax County
Bar Association, in adopting minimum fee schedules for services in-
cident to a client's purchase of a home (chiefly title searches), were
immune from Sherman Act liability on the ground that the Act does
not reach the activities of learned professions.69 The court relied for
support primarily on the two cases traditionally cited as the source of
the exemption: Federal Baseball Club v. National League of Profes-
sional Baseball Clubs" and FTC v. Raladam Co.71 Both cases, how-
ever, lend scant support to the idea of an unqualified exemption for
professional activities.
72
Federal Baseball held that the business of providing public profes-
sional baseball games for profit is not "commerce," because it is
strictly a local affair; as a result, no Sherman Act cause of action
67 The former limitation requires that an alleged restraint be upon "trade or commerce"
for the Sherman Act to apply. See American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519,
528-29 (1943). The latter excludes from Sherman Act proscription acts which do not affect the
commercial aspects of an activity allegedly restrained. See Margorie Webster Junior College
v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges and Secondary Schools, 432 F.2d 650, 654 (D.C. Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970). For detailed elucidation of the distinction see Note,
The Applicability of the Sherman Act to Legal Practice and Other "Non-Commercial"
Activities, 82 YALE L.J. 313, 314-18 (1972).
68 497 F.2d I (4th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 223 (1974). Goldfarb has sparked a
wealth of law review commentary. See, e.g., Note, 10 IDAHO L. REV. 257 (1974); Note, 9 U.
RICHMOND L. REV. 323 (1975); Comment, Minimum Fee Schedules: An Antitrust Problem,
48 TUL. L. REv. 682 (1974); Note, 9 WAKE FoREsr L. REV. 616 (1973).
69 497 F.2d at 13-15. The learned profession issue in Goldfarb has been framed for the
Supreme Court in the following terms:
Are bar associations which promulgate a minimum fee schedule exempt from
the price fixing prohibitions of the antitrust laws because the restraint on
competition is among the members of a "learned profession"?
5 TRADE REG. REP. 60,021, at 65,107 (Jan. 20, 1975).
70 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
71 283 U.S. 643 (1931).
72 See United States v. Oregon State Bar, 385 F. Supp. 507 (D. Ore. 1974), where the court
concluded, upon analysis of those decisions, that "[T]he 'learned profession' dicta in these
two cases have no current vitality." Id. at 515. But see Bank Bldg. & Equip. Corp. of
America v. Council of Architectural Registration Bds. and W. Va. Bd. of Architects, 5 TRADE
REG. REP. (1975 Trade Cas.) 60,108, at 65,229 (D.D.C. 1975), which held that the activities
of a professional architectural association and state architectural board are not subject to the
Sherman Act, on the grounds that "the profession of architecture is a 'learned profession' "
and that the practice of a learned profession is not trade or commerce within the meaning of
the Sherman Antitrust Act, § 1. Id. at 65,230' The court did not, however, indicate the basis
for its determination that architecture constitutes a "learned profession."
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would lie against one who interfered with that business. 73 The court
noted the noncommercial nature of "personal effort not related to
production. '74 However, serious questions have been raised about the
continued validity of that assertion.75 Indeed, Federal Baseball has
been frequently criticized by the Supreme Court; the Court has stead-
fastly refused to expand baseball's antitrust exemption to other sports
and has questioned the wisdom of continued recognition of the exemp-
tion in the case of baseball itself.76 Subsequent cases, 77 in dictum, at
least, have erected a sacrosanct boundary around the "learned
professions, '78 based upon Holmes' statement with respect to personal
services, on the theory that the professions are engaged in the rendering
of services, not trade or the production of goods in commerce. Such a
reading of Federal Baseball has been criticized on the grounds that the
case stands not for this principle, but only for the proposition that
interstate travel incident to the rendition of purely local services is not
sufficient to satisfy the interstate commerce jurisdictional requirement
of the Sherman Act.
79
FTC v. Raladam Co.8" is generally recognized as the other tradi-
tional foundation for the learned profession exemption. The case
involved a complaint by the Federal Trade Commission against a
vendor of patent medicines under section 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act.81 The Court affirmed the court of appeals' reversal of the
73 259 U.S. at 208-09.
74 Id. at 209.
75 See note 64 and accompanying text supra.
" See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972); Radovich v. Nat'l Football League, 352 U.S.
445 (1957); Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356 (1953). The Court has indicated that
it will interpret congressional refusal to overturn baseball's exemption as an indication of
legislative intent in favor of its continuation. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. at 283-84. The Court
has suggested that, if the question were considered de novo, baseball's exemption would not
prevail. Radovich v. Nat'l Football League, 352 U.S. at 452.
77 See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 497 F.2d 1, 13-19 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. granted,
95 S. Ct. 223 (1974); Marjorie Webster Junior College v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges and
Secondary Schools, 432 F.2d 650, 654 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970). As
already indicated, the Supreme Court has held, without directly addressing the existence of a
"learned profession" exemption, that personal services are subject to the Sherman Act. See
note 63 and accompanying text supra.
78 No satisfactory definition has been formulated to indicate those professions which will
be classified as "learned." See Pogue, supra note 46, at 313. Clearly, the courts are willing to
include doctors and lawyers within the category, but pharmacists, architects, and engineers
likewise have asserted the exemption as a defense to Sherman Act liability. The crucial issue
is not whether a particular profession is classified as "learned" but whether the exemption
itself is appropriate.
79 See United States v. Oregon State Bar, 385 F. Supp. 507,515 (D. Ore. 1974); Comment,
Personal Services and the Antitrust Laws, I WAYNE L. REV. 124, 131 (1955); Note, The
Applicability of the Sherman Act to Legal Practice and Other "Non-Commercial" Ac-
tivities, 82 YALE L.J. 313, 318-20 (1972).
80 283 U.S. 643 (1931).
81 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970), which prohibits "unfair methods of competition in commerce."
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Commission's cease-and-desist order, in analyzing whether respondent's
activities tended to injure its competitors noted:
Of course, [the] medical practitioners . . . [who revealed] the
danger of using the [patent-medicine] remedy without competent
advice... are not in competition with respondent. They follow
a profession and not a trade, and are not engaged in the business
of making or vending remedies but in prescribing them. 82
The creation of a "learned profession" exemption in this dictum is
wholly tangential to the Court's treatment of the issue in Raladam.
Standing alone, the Court's statement can not support a broad pro-
fessional exemption.
More recent statements of the doctrine, many of them extrapolated
from the dicta in Federal Baseball and Raladam, assert that "non-
commercial" aspects of the professions,,- at a minimum, are exempt
from Sherman Act liability. s3 Cases dealing with alleged Sherman Act
violations in health-related professions raise questions about the
existence of a professional exemption. 4 At least to a limited extent,
the courts appear willing to acknowledge tacitly a special status for
82 283 U.S. at 653 (emphasis added). The Court's observation arose in the context of its
argument that respondent's patent medicine remedies would not serve to injure those
allegedly in competition.
83 See, e.g., Marjorie Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges and
Secondary Schools, 432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970).
Marjorie Webster held that the defendant, a voluntary, non-profit educational corporation
which denied accreditation to a proprietary junior college, could not be enjoined from
denying such accreditation under the Sherman Act. The court commented that "the pros-
criptions of the Sherman Act were 'tailored . . . for the business world,' not for the non-
commercial aspects of the liberal arts and the learned professions." 432 F.2d at 654. Stress
might be placed on the term "non-commercial" in arguing that no blanket prohibition on
professional liability is to be implied. See A. NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAWSOFTHE U.S.A. 8-9
(2d ed. 1970), which suggests a distinction between "commercial" and "non-commercial"
activities as a basis for a qualified exemption. While the distinction has some surface appeal,
ready application of it may be more difficult. Clearly, minimum fee schedules, which
constitute a form of price-fixing, are commercial in nature, but the line becomes less distinct
when issues such as residence requirements, attorney discipline, and advertising restraints
are considered.
84 In Am. Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519, 528-29(1943), the Supreme Court,
while affirming a conspiracy conviction against the AMA under § 3 of the Sherman Act,
scrupulously avoided the issue of whether the practice of medicine constitutes a "trade"
under the Act. The Court did find that the Association's attempt to undermine the activities of
a nonprofit group health cooperative was a "conspiracy in restraint of trade" consisting
chiefly of coercive acts and threats against physicians associated with the group health plan.
Later, in United States v. Oregon Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326 (1952), the Court referred to
ethical considerations in the direct relationship between physician and patient which are
quite different from considerations prevailing in ordinary commercial matters. Id. at 336. The
Court dismissed the complaint on the grounds of failure to adduce sufficient evidence of the
defendant's concerted refusal to deal with private health associations engaged in the contract
practice of medicine. The Court declined to consider whether proof of such a refusal to deal
would constitute a violation of the antitrust laws, though Am. Medical Ass'n, supra, gives
some indication that it would be.
Cf. Northern California Pharmaceutical Ass'n. v. United States, 306 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 862 (1962); United States v. Utah Pharmaceutical Ass'n, 201
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professional groups that is justified by historical and ethical considera-
tions.18 In some of the cases emphasizing an exemption, however, the
issue arose only obliquely. Perhaps the more the activity resembles
group exertion of market power, the less amenable the courts will be
to conferring exempt status. s6 The organized bar's promulgation and
enforcement of restrictive residence requirements may constitute such
an exertion. In contrast, United States v. Oregon State Bars7 involved
a direct confrontation and rejection of the exemption.s The Supreme
Court's decision in Goldfarb could settle the exemption issue. But the
Court has several alternative grounds on which to dispose of the case
and may avoid ruling on whether a "learned profession" exemption
exists. Therefore, the future status of the exemption can only be a
matter for speculation.
Nevertheless, it should be clear that the authority of Federal Base-
ball and Raladam as the basis for the learned profession exemption is
questionable at best."9 The comments of the Supreme Court which
touch upon professional immunity in those cases are mere dicta, while
the holding in Federal Baseball has been suspect for some time.90
Whether the Supreme Court will expressly reject an exemption for the
practice of law is uncertain. As the cases indicate, 91 any professional
exemption is a qualified one at best; in any event it should not extend
to residence requirements which lack valid justification and which pro-
duce adverse economic consequences.
F. Supp. 29 (D. Utah 1962), aff'd per curiarn, 371 U.S. 24 (1962). Both cases denied the
defense of a "learned profession" exemption in the context of a conspiracy to fix drug prices.
On the whole, it would appear questionable for the bar to defend activities which would
otherwise constitute violations of the Sherman Act on the existence of a "learned profes-
sion" exemption. The profession may have been forewarned in this regard. See Wilson
Address, supra note 42, at 55,216.
s See, e.g., United States v. Oregon Medical Society, 343 U.S. 326, 336 (1952). The courts
might be reluctant to intervene directly into the attorney-client relationship on a similar
rationale, for example, but exertion of group economic influence should not be placed on a
similar footing, since traditional ethical justifications are not so strong where such power is
exercised.
86 See, e.g., Am. Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943). The Court noted
that the calling or occupation of the individual physicians charged as defendants is immaterial
if the purpose and effect of their conspiracy was to obstruct and restrain the business of
Group Health.
87 385 F. Supp. 507 (D. Ore. 1974). See also United States v. Nat'l Soc'y of Professional
Engineers, 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1974-2 Trade Cas.) 75,415, at 98,371 (D.D.C. 1974), which
rejected a "learned profession" exemption in the case of price-fixing by professional en-
gineers.
88 But see Bank Bldg. and Equip. Corp. of Am. v. Nat'l Council of Architectural Registra-
tion Bds. and W. Va. Bd. of Architects, 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1975 Trade Cas.) 60,108, at
65,229 (D.D.C. 1975).
89 For an enlightening analysis of the FederalBaseball decision see Note, The Applicabil-
ity of the Sherman Act to Legal Practice and Other "Non-Commercial" Activities, 82 YALE
L.J. 313, 318-20 (1972).
90 See note 76 supra.
"1 See text accompanying notes 84-88 supra.
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C. The State Action Exemption
The state action exemption to the antitrust laws, founded primarily
on the case of Parker v. Brown, 2 represents the third and perhaps
most fundamental, obstacle to application of the Sherman Act as a
means of striking down bar residence requirements. In substance,
Parker held that activity which would otherwise constitute a violation
of the Sherman Act can be immune when undertaken at the express
command of the state in pursuance of a recognized state policy to limit
competition. 93 The Court read the absence of any reference to state
activity in the Sherman Act as indicating a congressional intent to
exclude state action from the coverage of the Act.
Parker involved a challenge to the 1940 marketing program adopted
pursuant to the California Agricultural Prorate Act.94 The act
authorized the establishment by state officials of programs for the
marketing of agricultural commodities produced in the state. The
purpose of the programs was to restrict competition among growers
and to maintain prices in the distribution of their commodities to
packers. Appellee alleged in part that the marketing program's re-
strictions on competition in the raisin industry violated the Sherman
Act.93
Controversy over the meaning of Parker continues to the present
day.9" Since the decision was rendered, the courts have attempted to
92 317 U.S. 341 (1943). See also Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332 (1904), where the Supreme
Court exempted state pilotage licensing schemes from the application of the antitrust laws.
For an argument approving Olsen as indicative of a proper interpretation of congressional
intent not to supersede state regulatory activity in the field of occupational licensing see
Handler, Twenty-fourth Annual Antitrust Review, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7 (1972).
93 317 U.S. at 350-52. Parker involved a challenge to the 1940 marketing program adopted
pursuant to the California Agricultural Prorate Act. The Act authorized the establishment by
state officials, of programs for the marketing of agricultural commodities produced in the
state.
94 Act of June 5, 1933, ch. 754 [1933], Cal. Stat. 1969, as amended by chs. 471, 743 [1935],
Cal. Stat. 1530, 2088; ch. 6 [1938], Cal. Stat. 2485; ch. 1150, 1186 [19411], Cal. Stat. 1186, 2943.
Now CAL. AGRIC. CODE §§ 59501-59694 (West 1975).
95 317 U.S. at 346-47. The program was administered in a cooperative manner between
private individuals and state otficials, with substantial private input in the form of program
committees, whose members were selected by the State Director of Agriculture from a list of
nominees submitted by producers in a defined production zone. The committee's responsibil-
ity was to formulate a prorate marketing program for the commodity produced in the zone.
Appellee, a producer and packer of raisins in California, sought an injunction against
enforcement of the Act which would result in criminal proceedings against him and prevent
him from marketing his 1940 crop, from fulfilling his sales contract, and from purchasing for
sale and selling in interstate commerce raisins of that crop. Id. at 349. The district court in
granting an injunction held that enforcement of the 1940 raisin marketing program was an
illegal interference with and undue burden upon interstate commerce, though its opinion
does not mention the Sherman Act. 39 F. Supp. 895, 901 (S.D. Cal. 1941).
96 For recent scholarly treatments of the state action issue, see, e.g., Kintner & Kaufman,
The State Action Antitrust Immunity Defense, 23 AM. U.L. REV. 527 (1974); Simmons &
Fornaciari, State Regulation As An Antitrust Defense: An Analysis of the Parker v. Brown
Doctrine, 43 U. CIN. L. REV. 61 (1974); Slater, Antitrust and Government Action: A Formula
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apply the Supreme Court's reasoning to a wide variety of factual con-
texts. The inconsistency with which the exemption has been applied
makes clear an obvious shortcoming of Parker: the lack of a precise
description of those elements which may suggest the propriety of con-
ferring state action immunity in any given case.
97
In Goldfarb, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals posited three fac-
tors, which it believed to be implicit in Parker, as a basis on which to
exempt the Virginia State Bar from Sherman Act liability for the
promulgation of a minimum fee schedule: regulation for the bene-
fit of the public, regulation actively and continuously supervised
by the state, and regulation which receives its authority and
efficacy from a legislative command.95 Over a vigorous dissent99 the
court held that the minimum fee schedule promulgated by the Virginia
State Bar satisfied these tests and was not subject to Sherman Act
proscription. 10 The issue of state action is another of the questions
which the Supreme Court has been asked to consider in its review of
Goldfarb.1° 1 Nevertheless, the possibility that the Court may not settle
the issue makes it necessary to explore the Parker theory more fully.
At the outset, it is unclear whether the test for state action under
Parker envisions the same inquiry as that involved in cases under the
due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amend-
ment.'0 2 One observer has suggested that the test for state action under
the Sherman Act is much narrower than that applied to cases arising
for Narrowing Parker v. Brown, 69 Nw. U.L. REV. 71 (1974); Note, 13 B.C. IND. & COM. L.
REV. 393 (1971); Note, State Action Exemption From the Antitrust Laws, 50 B.U.L. REV. 393
(1970); Note, Of Raisins and Mushrooms: Applying the Parker Antitrust Exemption, 58 VA.
L. REV. 1511 (1972).
97 See Note, 13 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 393, 407 (1971).
98 497 F.2d at 6.
99 The dissent took particular issue with the court's claim that supervision by the Virginia
Supreme Court of the promulgation and implementation of fee schedules was in any sense
"active," but it concluded that the State Bar should be exonerated from Sherman Act
liability on the ground that its involvement with the fee schedules was "minor." 497 F.2d at
21 (dissenting opinion).
100 497 F.2d at 12.
101 The petitioners in Goldfarb have framed the state action issue in the following terms:
"Is the Virginia State Bar exempt from the antitrust laws under the doctrine of
Parker v. Brown for its role in a price-fixing arrangement utilizing minimum fee
schedules even though there is no statute authorizing the promulgation of such
schedules, and where the only independent state agency involved, the Virginia
Supreme Court, did not approve either the fee schedules themselves, the
reports of the State Bar which led to their adoption, or the opinions of the State
Bar which provided the enforcement mechanism for obtaining adherence to
such schedules?"
5 TRADE REG. REP. 60,021, at 65,107 (Jan. 20, 1975).
102 For a sampling of recent cases treating the state action issue in the context of the
fourteenth amendment, see, e.g., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972);
Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
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under the fourteenth amendment. 11 3 There appears to be support in
the case law for this view. 10 4 A plausible policy argument might be
made for the distinction since a strict state action standard in the anti-
trust field and a more liberal test in the realm of equal protection and
due process effectuate the respective remedial purposes of the Sherman
Act and the fourteenth amendment. In interpreting the Sherman Act,
the Supreme Court has emphasized the legislative policy favoring free
and unfettered competition.' 1 5
Clearly, the courts will not confer the Parker immunity on every
activity which has the color of state involvement. 106 In cases where
state action defenses have been sustained, the courts have appeared
to require more than an unsupervised delegation of state power to a
group having the responsibility to carry out an anticompetitive plan
of regulation.0 7 In Parker itself, the Court was quick to note by way
of limitation that
1' Comment, 5 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIV. LIB. L. REV. 301, 347 (1970). The Comment
suggests that, to qualify for the state action exemption, the activity in question should
provide a "politically responsible substitute for the market mechanism." Id.
"I Compare Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1047 (1972), with Wainwright v. Nat'l Dairy Products Corp., 304 F. Supp. 567 (N.D.
Ga. 1969).
Hecht involved a Sherman Act challenge, by individuals who sought to obtain a profes-
sional football franchise in Washington, D.C., to a restrictive covenant in a lease between the
football team presently occupying Robert F. Kennedy Stadium in the District of Columbia
and the District of Columbia Armory Board, which barred the use of the facility by any other
team for a period of thirty years. The Armory Board was authorized by statute to construct,
maintain, and operate a stadium in which athletic events and other activities might be held.
The court balanced the governmental interest involved in operation of the stadium by the
Armory Board against the policy of the antitrust laws and determined that the latter out-
weighed the claim that the restrictive lease covenant constituted exempt government acts.
444 F.2d at 933, 946-47.
Wainwright involved an alleged price fixing conspiracy among milk producers in Georgia.
The court held that the defendants could invoke the Georgia Milk Control Act as a defense to
the Sherman Act action. The actions of the Georgia Milk Control Commission in implement-
ing the act were deemed to be state action within the meaning of Parker. The court focused on
the following facts in reaching its conclusion: the Commission functioned as a state agency
within the Georgia Department of Agriculture; an elected state official, the Commissioner of
Agriculture, appointed the Commission's Chairman, fixed his compensation, and had dis-
missal power over him; and the chairman's salary was paid out of the general treasury of the
state. 304 F. Supp. at 574. Both Hecht and Wainwright suggest that substantial state in-
volvement in the regulatory scheme is a prerequisite for state action status. Cf. Reitman v.
Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967), where a state constitutional provision, on its face merely
affirming the right of a person to sell, lease, or rent real property to whomever he chooses,
was declared unconstitutional on the grounds that it implicated the state in active encour-
agement of discrimination.
"I See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1,4 (1958); Apex Hosiery Co.
v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469,489 (1940); cf. United States v. Cooper Corp., 31 F. Supp. 848, 850
(S.D.N.Y. 1940), aff 'd, 114 F.2d 413 (2d Cir. 1940), aff'd, 312 U.S. 600 (1941).
106 See, e.g., Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 438 F.2d
1286, 1294 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972); George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc., v.
Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25, 30 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850(1970).
107 See, e.g., State of New Mexico v. Am. Petrofina, Inc., 501 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1974); Gas
Light Co. of Columbus v. Ga. Power Co., 313 F. Supp. 860 (M.D. Ga. 1970), aff'd, 440 F.2d
1135 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972); Wainwright v. Nat'l Dairy Products
Corp., 304 F. Supp. 567 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
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a state does not give immunity to those who violate the Sherman
Act by authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that their
action is lawful .... 108
The most commonly advocated approach to reconciling the con-
tinued existence of anticompetitive state regulation with the federal
antitrust laws has been the balancing test."0 9 Thus, Parker is construed
to dictate that when state police power, exercised in the context of an
actively state-supervised regulatory scheme which is sufficiently related
to avowed state interests, comes into conflict with Sherman Act anti-
trust policy, the federal policy will yield."0 In analyzing the propriety
of applying Parker to exempt bar residence requirements from the anti-
trust laws, therefore, a twofold test must be satisfied. First, a
recognizable state intent to limit competition must be found. Second,
there must be active state supervision implementing an anticompetitive
state regulatory scheme.
It is not contended that states lack a legitimate interest in assuring
that members of the bar meet minimum standards of competence as a
prerequisite to the practice of law."1 Nevertheless, it is reasonable to
balance the protection of that interest against countervailing policies
such as individual freedom and the public need for an adequate supply
of attorneys at reasonable cost. Restrictive practices which lack suf-
ficient relationships to valid state interests and which are strongly
biased in favor of entrenched occupational groups should not qualify
for the state action exemption. 112 The status of licensed occupations
under present schemes has been likened to that of a private cartel, in
classical economic terms.1 13 In light of this economic impact, a re-
108 317 U.S. at 351.
109 For commentary urging adoption of such a test, see Slater, supra note 96, at 78, 91, 101,
105; Note, 13 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 393, 406 (1971); Note, OfRaisins and Mushrooms:
Applying the Parker Antitrust Exemption, 58 VA. L. REV. 1511, 1542 (1972).
110 See George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25 (1st Cir.
1970), where this philosophy is stated as follows:
Valid government action confers antitrust immunity only where government
determines that competition is not the summum bonnum in a particular field
and deliberately attempts to provide an alternate form of public regulation.
Id. at 30.
11 Advocacy of such an approach would be untenable given the conceded state interest in
the practice of law and the recognized state police power to regulate that practice. See note 15
and accompanying text supra.
112 Cf. notes 20-24 and accompanying text supra.
,13 Barron, supra note 23, at 644, describes the operation of such a cartel:
The purpose of a private cartel is to obtain and maintain monopolistic control of
the supply of a product or service for the purposes of enhancing the returns to
the members of the cartel and of protecting the members of the cartel from price
competition that would reduce the return to a competitive level. In order to
maintain its monopoly, the cartel must have the power ... to control entry into
the industry in order to prevent increased supply from reducing prices to the
competitive level. ...
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examination of the rationale of Parker and supporting cases with spe-
cific reference to bar admission practices appears warranted.
114
A second major question under the Parker rationale is the degree of
direct state supervision. Arguably, more direct state involvement in
the form of statutory admissions requirements might circumvent the
charge of insufficient state regulation. 115 Such direct legislative action
is comparatively rare; even statutory standards which lack a rational
relationship to valid state interests are still subject to attack on con-
stitutional grounds."', In many states, however, the highest appellate
court has the power to prescribe and administer rules for bar admis-
sion. Frequently, this power is exercised by quasi-official boards of
law or bar examiners who obtain, for all practical purposes, effective
control over the admission process.' 17 While a scheme involving a
degree of delegation was upheld in Parker, the exclusionary economic
aspect of residence requirements makes it crucial that courts closely
examine the supervision system before granting an exemption for
ostensible state action.""8
An example of the type of analysis which close scrutiny of state
action can produce is found in Asheville Tobacco Board of Trade v.
FTC119 In interpreting section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act, '2 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that activities of local
tobacco boards of trade, which were comprised of tobacco warehouse-
"14 Out of such an inquiry might emerge a clearer picture of the true interests-state or
private-served by current residence requirements.
"I Parker confers immunity upon a program found to have "derived its authority and its
efficacy from the legislative command of the state and ... not intended to operate or become
effective without that command." 317 U.S. at 350.
1,' See note 30 and accompanying text supra. Evidence ofjudicial willingness to examine
state determinations of an applicant's character and fitness is found in cases circumscribing
the power of a state to deny a license to practice law on grounds of lack of moral fitness. The
cases have generally arisen under the due process and/or equal protection clauses of the
fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1 (1971); Willner v.
Committee on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963); Konigsberg v. State Bar of
California, 353 U.S. 252 (1957); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of New Mexico, 353
U.S. 232 (1957). But cf. In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961); Konigsberg v. State Bar of
California, 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
117 See note 16 and accompanying text supra.
118 In Parker, for example, the Director of Agriculture, a state official, was an ex-officio
member of a nine-member Agricultural Prorate Advisory Commission. The other eight
members were appointed by the Governor for four-year terms, subject to Senate confirma-
tion, and were required to take an oath of office. The Director was also charged with the
responsibility, subject to Commission approval, of selecting members of the local program
committees. In turn, the prorate marketing program formulated by the committee was
subject to Commission ratification, following a public hearing and a consent requirement by
local producers. Finally, the Director was authorized to confer authority to administer the
program on the local committees. 317 U.S. at 346-47. In order to confer the state action
exemption on bar residence requirements, a comparable level of state involvement would be
required.
,,9 263 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1959).
"20 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970).
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men and purchasers and were authorized by state statute to adopt
reasonable rules and regulations for handling the sale of leaf tobacco,
were not immune by virtue of Parker from sanctions for unreasonable
restraints of trade. 12 1 The court singled out as its reasons for denying
immunity the lack of active state supervision and the fact that the
regulations primarily benefited private parties.
122
In United States v. Oregon State Bar123 the court also failed to find
active state involvement in the promulgation of minimum fee schedules,
though the Oregon State Bar was a public corporation and an instru-
mentality of that state's Judicial Department. 124 The analysis in that
case seemed to turn on the lack of close state supervision. 125
It is not feasible, therefore, to state useful general rules for the form
of state supervision which would be required to qualify the promulga-
tion of residence requirements for the state action exemption. The
requisite degree of active state supervision would depend on facts
unique to each state regulatory plan. Concededly, a rather forceful
argument might be mounted, in light of Parker and the tradition of
state involvement in the licensing process, that state action immunity
should remove restrictive elements in bar admission procedures from
antitrust sanctions.
On the other hand, to the extent that residence requirements are
restrictive, the circumstances may militate in the opposite direction.1
2
6
The exclusionary effect of residence requirements which protect a
privileged occupational group to the detriment to the public, 127 to-
gether with the apparent reluctance of courts to give Parker broad
application,128 suggest that the exemption can be successfully chal-
lenged. If the barriers of jurisdiction and exemption can be overcome,
121 263 F.2d at 508-10.
122 Id. at 509-10. Asheville, however, is distinguished on these points in Goldfarb, 497 F.2d
at 6-12, on the grounds that public and not private benefit is involved in the operation of the
Virginia State Bar, and that sufficiently active supervision is provided in the form of oversight
by the Virginia Supreme Court. Judge Craven dissented with respect to the degree of "active
supervision" in the case of minimum fee schedules. 497 F.2d at 20-21.
123 385 F. Supp. 507 (D. Ore. 1974).
124 385 F. Supp. at 511.
125 Id.
126 Bard & Bamford, supra note 5, at 441, cogently identify the need for the legal profes-
sion to take the lead in an inquiry into the restrictive effect of residence requirements.
The initial burden must be on the lawyers themselves to institute action.
Who, but the law profession, is familiar with the antitrust laws? Who, but the
law profession, has been victimized by unfair and immobilizing bar admission
rules? And who, but the law profession, can meet the challenge of creating an
individual or class action suit which will pass muster in the very forum against
which it is directed?
127 See text accompanying notes 168-171 infra.
121 See note 106 supra.
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it is appropriate to explore the impact which the Sherman Act may
have on restrictive bar admission requirements.
IV. ANTITRUST ANALYSIS OF RESIDENCE REQUIREMENTS
The requirement of establishing a "restraint of trade or commerce"
under the Sherman Act as a prerequisite for violation of either section
1129 or section 2130 has been previously discussed at length. 131 However,
the fulfillment of this requirement alone will not suffice to sustain a
Sherman Act action.
In addition to the finding of a restraint of trade, a section 1 violation
consists of some "contract, combination, or conspiracy."'1 32 In the case
of trade associations, it has been suggested that this element is satisfied
by the fact of joint membership by competitors in a collective organ-
ization.133 Combination among competitors in the legal profession is
particularly strong in states which require membership in an integrated
or unified bar as a prerequisite to the practice of law. 134 Whether an
individual attorney actively supports the policies behind restrictive
residence requirements is of little consequence, assuming that a bar
organization of which he is a member promotes such policies. 35
In contrast, section 2 of the Sherman Act reaches "[e]very person
who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or con-
spire to monopolize .... ,113 "Monopoly power" has been defined, in
part, as the "power to exclude competition."' 37 Subsequent analysis
herein will draw primarily upon cases arising under section 1 of the
129 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
130 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
I3 See notes 47-60 and accompanying text supra.
132 15 U.S.C § 1 (1970).
133 See Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 612
(1914), which inferred the existence of a conspiracy in restraint of trade against wholesale
lumber dealers who sold directly to consumers, by virtue of the circulation of the names of
the wholesalers among members of several associations of retail lumber dealers. Monroe,
Practical Antitrust Considerations for Trade Associations, 1969 UTAH L. REV. 622 (1969).
See also Note, Trade Association Exclusionary Practices: An Affirmative Role for the Rule
of Reason, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1486 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Columbia Note].
,3' At present, the following jurisdictions compel membership in such a body: Alabama,
Alaska, Arizona, California, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyom-
ing. J. PARNESS, CITATIONS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY ON THE UNIFIED BAR IN THE UNITED STATEs 3,
4 (1973). The integrated bar movement has experienced steady growth in the last half
century. See note 17 supra.
M See note 18 supra.
136 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970). See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71
(1966) and American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809 (1946), for elucidation
of the monopoly concept of § 2.
"I7 United States v. duPont & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).
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Sherman Act. 138 It will be demonstrated that a "bottleneck"'13 analogy
may be applied to residence requirements to establish a violation of
section 1.
In analyzing the applicability of section 1 to bar admission require-
ments, the concept of a concerted refusal to deal,14° effected by means
of a group boycott, should be considered. It is common to speak of
such practices as falling within a category of per se illegality, 14' but
caution should be exercised in reaching the conclusion that proof of
a concerted refusal on the part of the legal profession would be so
viewed.
142
The concerted refusal to deal is manifested in the commercial con-
text by an agreement or combination which bars dealings with or
limits the extent to which parties to the agreement will deal with a
competitor or potential competitor. 143 Adherence to the combination
is often enforced by a system of privately imposed sanctions against
138 It has been suggested that the strictures against monopoly in § 2 of the Sherman Act are
aimed primarily at the acquisition and retention of market power by a single firm which
thereby becomes capable of producing the same economic effects as a combination. A.
NEALE, supra note 83, at 92. The atomized nature of legal practice and the legal profession
would seem to elude this characterization. However, the support by members of the bar for
the promulgation and enforcement of residence requirements and the role of some lawyers in
the process suggests § I as a more persuasive line of analysis. See Klor's, Inc. v.
Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc. 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Fashion Originators' Guild of American,
Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
139 The "bottleneck" analysis is that of A. NEALE, supra note 83, at 63, 66-69.
140 For more detailed discussion of concerted refusals to deal, see generally Barber,
Refusals to Deal Under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 847 (1955); Bird,
Sherman Act Limitations on Non-Commercial Concerted Refusals to Deal, 1970 DUKE L.J.
247 (1970). Bird terms the concerted refusal to deal "nothing more than an agreement among
a number of economic actors to sever or limit economic relations with another economic
actor or actors." Id. at 248.
14' See, e.g., Kor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Fashion
Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); Eastern
States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914). See generally
Horsley, Per Se Illegality and Concerted Refusals to Deal, 13 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 484
(1972). In general, the per se concept invalidates
certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on
competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be
unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise
harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use .... Among the
practices which the courts have heretofore deemed to be unlawful in and of
themselves are price fixing .... divisions of markets, .. group boycotts,..
and tying arrangements.
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (citations omitted).
142 See Bird, supra note 140; Columbia Note, supra note 133.
143 See, e.g., Kor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 209 (1959) (con-
certed refusal to deal in violation of § 1 in the form of a refusal by defendant manufacturers,
distributors, and retailers to sell to plaintiff retailer or to sell to it only at discriminatory
prices, in an attempt to drive plaintiff from competition); Fashion Originators' Guild of
America, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 312 U.S. 4.57, 461 (1941) (boycott of retailers who
sold garments copied by other manufacturers from designs produced by Guild members held
to violate Sherman Act).
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parties to the agreement. 144 The effectiveness of such concerted refusals
to deal in restraining competition is a primary reason for their
treatment as per se violations of the Sherman Act.
145
The bottleneck analogy is helpful in analyzing the attributes of the
concerted refusal to deal which may inhere in bar residence require-
ments. By analogy, imagine a group of competitors who exercise con-
trol over some essential commodity or facility in order to bar potential
new competitors from entry into a particular market or activity, there-
by reducing competitive pressures upon persons already in the
group. 146 The characterization is limited to situations where the essen-
tial facility can not practicably be duplicated by those who wish to
enter into competition. 47 It may validly be argued that the "facility,"
in the bar admission setting, is the license which one must obtain in
order to practice law, with a "bottleneck" imposed in the form of
restrictive residence requirements.
14
The leading case in which a "bottleneck" theory was employed to
establish a section 1 violation is Associated Press v. United States.'
49
Associated Press involved a complex system of bylaws formulated by
the defendant, a news-gathering-and-dissemination agency, which, in
substance, prohibited its members from selling news to nonmembers
and which conferred substantial power upon members to block com-
petition from nonmembers, 150 since lack of access to Associated Press
news rendered competition in the newspaper business extremely diffi-
cult.15 In upholding the district court injunction against continued
enforcement of those bylaws restricting membership and forbidding
provision of news by members to nonmembers, 152 the Supreme Court
noted:
Trade restraints of this character aimed at the destruction of
competition, tend to block the initiative which brings newcomers
into a field of business and to frustrate the free enterprise system
which it was the purpose of the Sherman Act to protect."53
144 See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1,8 (1945); Fashion Originators' Guild
of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 465-66 (1941).
"I See Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 211-12 (1959).
146 A. NEALE, supra note 83, at 66.
147 Id. at 67; cf. Bird, supra note 140, at 272.
148 The practical unavailability of legal practice to one who is not licensed is manifest in the
universal sanctions against the unauthorized practice of law. See generally UNAUTHORIZED
PRACTICE HANDBOOK (J. Fischer & D. Lachmann ed. 1972).
'49 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
150 326 U.S. at 4, 9, 13. The bylaws operated to deny access to AP news on the part of
nonmembers while erecting substantial barriers to the acquisition of membership privileges
by outsiders.
151 326 U.S. at 13.
152 52 F. Supp. 362, 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
53 326 U.S. 1, 13-14.
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One possible interpretation of the rationale of Associated Press is
that the Court will not permit private bodies to act in a judicial
capacity. Other decisions have struck down private systems which
created extensive regulation of an industry and imposed quasi-judicial
sanctions on group members.15 4 However, the case can also be read
to impose a duty to provide reasonable access to unique facilities
necessary to effective competition, when those facilities are controlled
so as to restrain trade. 155 The latter proposition carries an implicit
warning that residence restrictions on bar admission could be held to
constitute such a denial of access to the practice of law and that they
would be eliminated on that basis. The license to practice law is a
condition precedent to entry into the field and is clearly a facility
which can not be duplicated. On the rationale of Associated Press,
therefore, unreasonable barriers to obtaining it could be invalid.
As a limitation on the bottleneck theory, however, courts have sus-
tained "trade association" exclusionary practices which were found to
be reasonably necessary for achieving proper objectives. In Deesen v.
Professional Golfers' Association of America (PGA),1" 6 a Sherman Act
challenge was raised to the action of the PGA in terminating the plain-
tiff's status as an approved tournament player because of insufficient
playing ability and failure to compete in the requisite number of tour-
naments. Rejecting the plaintiff's allegation that the PGA and its
members combined and conspired to monopolize the business of
professional golf, the court held that the restraints imposed by the
PGA were reasonable in light of its intention to foster competition by
keeping tournament size within manageable proportions."'1 In re-
sponse to a charge under section 2 of the Act, the court conceded the
existence of monopoly power in the PGA over the business of profes-
sional golf but found no evidence that the organization intended to use
that power to exclude golfers from its tournaments or to suppress
competition.5's
"I See Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 465-66 (1941);
cf. Columbia Note, supra note 132, at 1502.
"I See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 21 (1945).
156 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 846 (1966).
157 358 F.2d at 170.
158 358 F.2d at 171. See also Molinas v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 190 F. Supp. 241
(S.D.N.Y. 1961), upholding as nonviolative of the Sherman Act an indefinite suspension and
refusal to reinstate in the case of a professional basketball player convicted of gambling
violations. But see Blalock v. Ladies Professional Golf Ass'n, 359 F. Supp. 1260 (N.D. Ga.
1973), which condemned as a "naked restraint of trade" the action of fellow professional
golfers in suspending the plaintiff from competition for alleged rule infractions. In Molinas,
the plaintiff was suspended in accordance with established league rule and standard contract
clause dealing with gambling by players. 190 F. Supp. at 243-44. In Blalock, however, the
court found that the decision to suspend the plaintiff was made in the exercise of the
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Exclusionary effects of residence requirements in the legal profes-
sion might also be viewed in light of the Supreme Court's decision in
Silver v. New York Stock Exchange. 9 The Exchange was held liable,
under section 1 of the Sherman Act, for withdrawing approval of pri-
vate wire connections between securities firms in New York and the
plaintiff's nonmember brokerage firm in Texas, without notice or op-
portunity for hearing. The connections were deemed vital to effective
communication, and their severance was held to constitute a substan-
tial injury to plantiff's brokerage business. In finding a violation of the
Act, the Court eschewed reliance upon a rule of per se illegality for
an action which allegedly constituted a concerted refusal to deal and
instead sought to balance the policies of self-regulation inherent in
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 with the Sherman Act's
emphasis upon free competition.16
As previously indicated, the classic concerted refusal to deal has
been held to constitute a per se violation of the antitrust laws.'"' Cases
like Deesen and Silver, however, indicate that the presence of counter-
vailing policies may prompt a court to invoke a "rule of reason"'
6 2
approach to validate practices which would otherwise constitute vio-
lations of the Sherman Act.1"' The "rule of reason" approach envisions
consideration of a range of factors which may lead to a determination
that the harm incident to a particular restraint does not warrant its
invalidation under the Sherman Act.16 4 In the case of bar admission
residence requirements, both the state interest in the practice of law
and the asserted rationale of public protection1 65 would likely be
"completely unfettered subjective discretion" of her fellow players, who stood to benefit
financially from such exclusion. 359 F. Supp. 1265.
1sa 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
160 373 U.S. at 357.
"61 See notes 140-42 and accompanying text supra.
1'62 The "rule of reason" test was first enunciated in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221
U.S. 1, 60 (191 1), where the Court held that the Sherman Act was intended to apply only to
those "contracts, combinations, and conspiracies" which operated unreasonably to restrain
trade. The classic formulation of the basic doctrine and the inquiry which it envisions is found
in the majority opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis in Chicago Board of Trade v. United States,
246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918):
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as
may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the
court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the
restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the
nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the
restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular
remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.
163 See generally Bird, supra note 140; Monroe, supra note 133; Columbia Note, supra
note 133.
164 See note 163 supra.
1'5 See text accompanying note 29 supra.
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pressed as arguments for applying the rule of reason analysis in evalu-
ating whether these restraints violate the Sherman Act.
In order to establish that residence requirements do represent an
unreasonable restraint of trade, it is necessary to examine more closely
the economic and social impact of these requirements.
The first major area of impact is the geographic distribution of
attorneys and income levels. First, states whose residence requirements
were among the most restrictive, and which were challenged on that
basis in the early part of this decade, 16 all had fewer lawyers per capita
than the per capita figure for the nation as a whole. 167 While other fac-
tors contribute to these ratios, such substantial deviations are at least
partly related to residence requirements. In turn, a relative undersupply
of attorneys in a given state is likely to influence the level of average
attorney income.16 Artificially high income levels can be maintained
only by the continuation of an enforced undersupply of attorneys. The
public pays the costs of this system because of the restriction on price
competition.169
In light of rapidly expanding law school enrollments17 0 the problem
of attorney undersupply may be reduced nationally. However, the
problem of misallocation of attorneys will continue to place artificial
restraints on the price-competition mechanism.1
71
A second major impact of residence requirements is the restraint
placed on attorney mobility. The Supreme Court, interpreting the con-
stitutionality of congressional action under the commerce clause, has
held that the interstate movement of persons for commercial or non-
166 See note 30 supra.
167 AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, 1971 LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT 6, 26 (1972). The
figures, which represent number of state residents per lawyer (1970 data), are as follows:
N ational .............................. 572
North Carolina ......................... 1095
H aw aii ................................ 850
M ississippi ............................ 802
New M exico ........................... 770
G eorgia ............................... 748
168 For a discussion of the economic relationship between client demand and lawyer
supply, see generally Katzman, There is a Shortage of Lawyers, 21 J. LEGAL ED. 169 (1968).
See also Holen, supra note 6, at 494.
169 See note 168 supra. One byproduct of lawyer undersupply is increased use of persons
not trained in the law to perform tasks traditionally done by attorneys. The public might be
victimized as a result. Merson, Meeting Legal Needs: A New Malthusian Dilemma, 47
DENVER L.J. 54 (1970). For an illustration of similar phenomenon in the medical profession,
see M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 155-56.
170 The American Bar Foundation indicated that the size of first-year law classes increased
over 30 percent from 1966 to 1970. AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, 1971 LAWYER STATISTICAL
REPORT 20 (1972) (Computation based on data reported therein).
171 Holen, supra note 6, at 496.
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commercial purposes is embraced by the commerce power. 7 2 If, as has
been asserted, the power of Congress under the Sherman Act is co-
extensive with its power under the commerce clause,' 7' then an im-
pediment to the interstate movement of persons could be grounds for
imposing Sherman Act liability.
The impact of residence requirements upon general commerce has
been discussed herein.7 4 While no concrete data exist to delineate the
degree to which residence requirements hinder attorneys in rendering
legal services in interstate transactions, the potential for such inter-
ference clearly exists and has been identified by some observers. 175
The influence which lawyers and law firms exercise in business affairs
has been seen by some as a fact of modern economic life.
76
A future impact of residence requirements is likely to occur with
the trend in the legal profession toward specialization. With the in-
creasing complexity of legal and business problems, current movement
within the profession toward specialization is likely to continue and
expand. 7 7 A likely result of such specialization will be the emergence
of groups of highly trained attorneys in fields such as antitrust or patent
law whose services will be demanded on a nationwide basis. Residence
requirements may serve to check the growth of this phenomenon. 7
Violation of the Sherman Act is manifest in the case of residence
requirements which lack a proper relation to valid state interests,
172 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
173 See text accompanying note 49 supra.
174 See notes 59-60 and accompanying tex t supra.
175 See note 59 supra.
176 Bodle, Fogel, Julber, Reinhardt & Rothschild and Teamsters Local 495, Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters, 206 N.L.R.B. No. 60,84 L.R.R.M. 1321 (1973), 1973 CCH NLRB DEC. 25,863,
at 33,339 (dissenting opinion). The dissent noted,
Without the services of the legal profession, American business as we know it
today could not function. The legal profession plays a vital role at all stages
from the act of incorporation through the obtaining of licenses or certificates
which might be needed, governmental approval of rates and/or routes, the
issuance and sale of stocks and bonds, the negotiations and preparation of legal
contracts necessary for the holding of property, and the purchase and sale of
materials and products, to name but a few aspects, and all these have their
impact on how, where, and when a business may operate. To brush all this
aside with the observation that a law firm renders services related to law rather
than commerce. . . is unrealistic, indeed. It is more realistic to say that without
such services their clients would be unable to engage in such commerce and
that there is a very direct and very immediate impact which must be recog-
nized.
Id. at 33,342.
"7 See Brakel, supra note 29, at 1084, 1088; Merson, supra note 169, at 60; Mindes,
Lawyer Specialty Certification: The Monopoly Game, 61 A.B.A.J. 42 (1975); Smith, The
Legal Profession and Professional Competence, 15 J. L. OFFICE ECON. & MANAGEMENT 55,
57 (1974).
171 See generally Mindes, supra note 177, for an interesting discussion of problems-of
monopoly that might arise from lawyer specialist certification and regulation.
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which unreasonably restrain commerce by restricting entry into the
profession, which reduce mobility, and which hinder the growth of
specialization. The fact that members of the bar derive economic bene-
fit from the maintenance of these requirements further warrants careful
scrutiny by the courts.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Close examination of the restrictive effect of bar admission residence
requirements is clearly necessary. The requirement that an individual
achieve residency status before being entitled to take the bar examina-
tion often serves motives no more substantial than the protection of
the economic interests of the local bar. In light of this motive and the
adverse impact of such requirements upon people who wish to enter
the legal profession or to relocate their practice, Sherman Act claims
against these restrictions should be recognized and upheld.
Significantly, the proposed Model Code of Rules for Admission to
the Practice of Law of the National Conference of Bar Examiners
eliminates any requirement of state residency as a prerequisite for
admission by examination.'7 9 The proposed Model Code, however,
does maintain the requirement of bona fide residence as a prerequisite
for admission as well as the requirement of intent to practice law on a
continuing basis for foreign attorneys seeking admission. 80 The former
proposal would be a positive step in reducing the-barriers to initial
entry. The latter proposal is questionable in terms of Sherman Act
analysis because of the greater significance of residence restrictions in
the case of established practitioners who seek either permanent reloca-
tion or substantial interstate practice.
The organized bar appears to have a substantial interest in the
perpetuation of a system which erects obstacles to entry into the pro-
fession. Many courts might be reluctant to examine afresh the special
status of activities in the legal profession which operate in restraint of
trade. In any event, as with the problem of minimum fee schedules, the
mere suggestion that residence requirements may be subject to Sherman
Act proscriptions could be sufficient to stimulate reform without the
necessity of litigation.
The elimination of residence requirements and the substitution of a
declaration of intent to conduct a substantial portion of one's practice
179 National Conference of Bar Examiners, Proposed Model Code of Rules for Admission
to the Practice of Law, 40 BAR EXAMINER 129, 131 (1971).
180 Id. at 136.
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within the state might be a proper compromise.' This device would
impose at least a moral obligation upon the attorney and would indi-
cate some degree of desire to affiliate himself with the local bar. Ob-
viously, an individual who had not yet practiced law would still be
required to pass a bar examination in at least one state, but eligibility
to take the examination would not be conditioned upon residency
status. The foreign attorney seeking admission on motion would be re-
quired to file the same declaration of intent. Disciplinary problems
could be handled by a system of reciprocity among the states, whereby
complaints could be referred to the jurisdiction responsible for issuing
the attorney's license to practice.
In many instances, an attorney's practice never takes him beyond
the boundaries of a single jurisdiction. The elimination of residence
requirements, however, facilitates movement in an age when that
phenomenon has become commonplace. As society becomes increas-
ingly mobile, there appears to be less justification for binding attorneys
to practice in a single jurisdiction or for limiting their initial choice on
the basis of a residence qualification. The legal profession should seek
to raise the level of competence of its members, present and prospec-
tive, but not by maintaining artificial and arbitrary limits to the
opportunities of otherwise qualified persons. The elimination of resi-
dence requirements on a Sherman Act rationale would help achieve
this goal.
-Harvey Freedenberg
381 Cf. Note, Residence Requirements for Initial Admission to the Bar: A Compromise
Proposalfor Change, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 831, 844-46, advocating a "conditional licensing"
approach.
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